DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 224 728 SO 014 335

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TITLE Citizen Attitudes toward Government, Race, Policy: The Liberal Tradition and Racial Inequality.
PUB DATE Sep 82
NOTE 32p.; Support for this project provided by Indiana Univ. Graduate School. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Denver, CO, September 2-5, 1982).
PUB TYPE Viewpoints (120) -- Speeches/Conference Papers (150)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Blacks; Capitalism; *Competition; Government Role; Majority Attitudes; *Policy Formation; *Public Support; *Racial Discrimination
IDENTIFIERS Free Enterprise System; *Liberalism

ABSTRACT

Classical liberalism shapes white Americans' attitudes toward government policies concerning blacks. Classical liberalism views society as competitive; government serves as a guarantor of fair competition. The rules of fairness in a competitive marketplace require no arbitrary exclusion from competition and no arbitrary denial of the fruits of success. Thus, an individual's identity is determined by his demonstration of discipline and responsibility in order to succeed. Public policies which threaten this identity through "market alternatives," such as affirmative action, busing, and programs aiding blacks, are rejected by market liberals. Data from 1972 and 1976 national election studies suggest that white Americans justify their rejection of market-threatening policies by downplaying the market disabilities inflicted on victims of past discrimination, defending the basic fairness of contemporary competition, and asserting the potency of the skilled, marketable competitor. While classical liberals perceive the exclusion of blacks from the marketplace as indefensible and support government activity to ensure fairness of competition, they reject policy directly influencing the outcomes of competition. The basis of policy evaluation, then, should be the intent of the policy concerning rules of competition rather than the beneficiaries (blacks) or the vehicle (government). (Author/KC)

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Citizen Attitudes Toward Government, Race, Policy: The Liberal Tradition and Racial Inequality

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Prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Denver Hilton Hotel, 2-5 September 1982, Denver, Colorado. Copyright by the American Political Science Association.

ABSTRACT

This paper asserts that classical liberalism in America expresses itself in the view of society as a marketplace in which individuals compete. The standards of fairness in such a market are rather simple, but they are sufficiently broad to render exclusion and discrimination against blacks indefensible. White Americans with genuine commitments to market liberalism should support policies that guarantee inclusion of blacks in the market. But the activation of these values on behalf of blacks places fairly strict conditions on race policy, precluding market-altering policies that challenge the "cult of the earner."

This paper explores the evolution of white Americans' attitudes for evidence that such values have been at work in the evolution of white attitudes about government race policy. Employing data gathered from 1964 to 1980 in the SRC/CPS American National Election Studies, the study demonstrates the emergence of support for policy approaches consonant with classical liberal values and the decline of support for policies that challenge classical liberal values.

The implications for future race policy, and for racial inequality, of continued American reliance on market liberal values of policy evaluation are discussed in the concluding section of the paper.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Russell Hanson, Edward Carmines, Byrum Carter, Jim Kuklinski, Rick Wilson and Gerald Wright for stimulation and advice concerning various aspects of the thesis presented in this paper. Maria Papadakis offered advice and assistance concerning both the content and organization of the argument; her help was very valuable.

I also wish to acknowledge the help of the staff of the Political Science Data Archive and Laboratory at Indiana University. Fern Anderson, Woody Kay, Jeanne Schaaf, and Fred Smoller all offered crucial help and support during the analysis of the data reported here. The data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original source, collectors of the data, nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses and interpretations presented here.

The Indiana University Graduate School provided funds in support of my presentation of the paper. Its assistance is greatly appreciated.

INTRODUCTION

When Louis Hartz wrote The Liberal Tradition in America, he worried that American commitment to classical liberalism had become so universal by the 1950's that it threatened to issue in illiberal conformitarianism. (Hartz, 1955). It is interesting to consider whether The Liberal Tradition in America might have had a different tone had it been written around 1965 rather than 1955. By 1965, the emergence of civil rights activism had challenged America's status as the locus of the greatest fulfillment of the liberal promise, and massive resistance against civil rights initiatives hardly seemed to qualify America as the home of nearly unanimous liberal commitment.

Whatever difficulties the attitudes and events of the "Second Reconstruction" posed for the Hartzian thesis in 1965, there is much about America in 1982 that seems to vindicate the Hartzian view. Race policies and practices of a narrowly classical liberal sort have received substantial, if slowly emerging, support. Alternative "unliberal" approaches to race policy and practice -- whether stemming from points on the political spectrum to the left or the right of classical liberalism--have been increasingly regarded as anathema.

The primary purpose of this paper is neither to vindicate Hartz nor to congratulate white America for eventually beginning to extend to blacks the rights that classical liberalism suggests should be conferred on all people. Rather, this paper has two aims: to assert that among white Americans the classical liberal approach to race policy has come to be and is likely to remain the left-most limit of acceptability, and to offer some considerations about the consequences of reliance on such a policy approach.

The discussion to be presented proceeds in three general sections. The first section develops a general view of classical liberalism and its practical manifestations in the attitudes of many Americans. As in Merriman and Parent (1982), these practical manifestations are termed the "market mode", connoting a way of life that views society as an arena in which individuals compete for things they want. Government's role in such an arena is to serve as guarantor of fair competition. The aim of such guarantees of competitive fairness is to legitimate unequal outcomes and establish desert, an aim that precludes certain other types of government policy activity.

The second section of the paper looks at the evolution of white attitudes about race policy options from 1964 to 1980. This section will document the growth of white support for classical liberal race policy approaches, trace the rejection of non-liberal race policy alternatives by white Americans, and indicate that "market mode" ideas about individual competition in the social marketplace are at the heart of contemporary evaluations of government race policies.

The third section considers the implications of the foregoing exploration. Two sets of implications receive attention. First

considered are the ways in which this paper's approach can help resolve some unresolved questions in political science literature on race and policy. Second considered is the likelihood of American resort to something other than market liberal values in evaluating race policy alternatives. The economic implications of continued American reliance on market liberal race policy approaches is discussed.

I. LIBERALISM, THE MARKET MODE, AND GOVERNMENT POLICY

Louis Hartz has written that "...the American community is a liberal community." (Hartz, 1955: 3). This paper cannot undertake anything like Hartz's genealogy of European classical liberal ideas, and it will not be concerned with the nature of their arrival and triumph in America. The primary concern here is with developing a working account of classical liberal views of the individual, society, and government. From this account we can then make reasonable inferences to the nature of American views on these matters.

Liberalism as Market Ideology

Classical liberalism is, as Wills notes, "the philosophy of the marketplace." (Wills, 1969: ix). We can understand classical liberalism's views of man, society, and government when we see that these views are intimately bound up with questions of individual competition, market allocation, and legitimate possession. Macpherson has surveyed the development of English liberalism from Hobbes to Locke and has concluded that the result of that development was a "political theory of possessive individualism." (Macpherson, 1962).

This theory is virtually the creed of the market mode of thought and practice. Macpherson presents this creed in seven propositions:

(i) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others.

(ii) Freedom from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with others except those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own interest.

(iii) The individual is essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to society.

(iv) Although the individual cannot alienate the whole of his property in his own person, he may alienate his capacity to labour.

(v) Human society consists of a series of market relations.

(vi) Since freedom from the wills of others is what makes a man human, each individual's freedom can rightfully be limited only by such obligations and rules as are necessary to secure the same freedom for others.

(vii) Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the individual's property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of orderly relations between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves. (Macpherson, 1962: 263-264).

Liberalism asserts that man is most truly himself when he is most free to pursue his self-interest. This pursuit of self-interest is to engage individual capabilities that owe nothing of their existence to society. Thus, liberalism allows only a very narrow conception of society and its purposes: society is a market--an arena--in which the primary obligation its members have to one another is to obey the rules necessary to ensure fair relations between self-interested competitors; in which the government's primary function is to enforce such fair relations; and in which the "public good" is the facilitation, by containment within rules, of the clash of individual wills in the pursuit of valued goods. (Roelofs, 1976: 61).

Market Liberalism and America

There are many pieces of evidence one could introduce to illustrate America's commitment to market liberalism. Perhaps the most pertinent evidence for present purposes is to note that the view of society as a marketplace has a controlling influence in American debates over government's proper role in society. We are accustomed to describing contemporary political actors as taking "conservative" and "liberal" stands on the question of government's proper role.

But, as Wills suggests, these alleged polarities actually exist within a broad agreement. He reports,

> Here is Ronald Reagan on the subject: "We offer equal opportunity at the starting line of life, but no compulsory tie for everyone at the finish." Here is Nixon: "I see a day when every child in this land has ...an equal chance to go just as high as his talents will take him." Here is Rockefeller: "I see...the welfare concept...as a floor below which nobody will be allowed to fall, but with no ceiling to prevent anyone from rising as high as he want to rise." Here is Humphrey: "I'll take my stand, as I always have, on equal opportunity...Our goal is an environment within which all types of business rivalry can flourish." (Wills, 1969: 223).

Such rhetorical examples could be multiplied endlessly. And there is little evidence that updating the cast of utterers to include the names of Carter, Mondale, Kennedy, Bush, and Baker would significantly alter

the general opinion that government's role in society is to facilitate competition, not to alter its outcomes. That the competition must go on is the consensus position of American market liberalism.

Market Liberalism and Government Policy

The point of competition is to win. The point of certifying competition as "fair" is to make the outcome unassailable. The running back who gets the football into the endzone has won his competition against tacklers. But it is up to the referee to certify that that the competition was fair, the result binding, and that the offense can "keep" its six points. The evidence of such certification is the absence of penalty flags and penalizing activity.

Can social competition between individuals be thought of in the same way? The things individuals want in life vary greatly, exhausting the spectrum of human tastes and preferences. In a society committed to fair competition in the social marketplace, the characteristic common to all desires is the expectation that a proper mixture of skills and effort will lead to their satisfaction. A properly functioning market does not guarantee that any competitor will get what he or she wants. Rather it guarantees that the individual will get and hold what he or she can earn given the talents and energy each possesses and employs. Of course, the values of one's talents fluctuate and the costs of desired things can change.

Suppose that a hypothetical person decides he wants to own a $100,000 home in a nice neighborhood. He competes in society for the resources he needs to buy such a home. A "fair" market does not guarantee that he will get that house. It does guarantee that in a field of N competitors his a priori chance of getting it is 1/N (On this matter see Dorn, 1979). By an equal a priori chance we mean that no arbitrary or irrelevant impediments inhibit him. If he has a third grade education he may have a hard time getting the kind of job that would allow him to buy the house he wants. But that difficulty is a consequence of the skills he is "marketing," and not an instance of some unfairness in the market. Of course, if he does get $100,000 together, fairness dictates that he not be prevented from buying the house. In sum, the most general rules of fairness in a competitive marketplace are: 1) no arbitrary exclusion from competition, and 2) no arbitrary denial of the fruits of success. Government's role is to enforce these rules. When it does so, it establishes the predictable link between striving and reward that encourages--as nothing else can--the competitiveness that is so much a facet of American life.

Of course, no perfectly fair competitive market has ever existed, especially not in the United States. It is clear that blacks have been arbitrarily excluded from full access to market competition and have been denied its rewards. What should be the policy response to this unfairness? Two government policy options are obvious:

1) determine that past competition was unfair, that its outcomes cannot be sanctioned and legitimated, and that

a) the goods distributed in that unfair past competition will be gathered and redistributed, or
b) subsequent competition will be altered in favor of victims of past unfairness;

or,

2) determine that "from now on" the competition will be fair, government will enact and enforce policies that guarantee everyone access to the marketplace and enjoyment of its rewards.

White racists would, presumably, oppose both options 1 and 2 on the obvious grounds of disliking blacks and wishing to subjugate them. Non-racist whites concerned about new government activity would presumably be concerned about both options, but if forced, would choose option 2 as involving less activity. What would the stance of the market liberal be?

The Cult of the Earner

The answer to the question above can be discerned, with justice to its complexity, by a full understanding of what the market liberal has at stake when confronting policy options of this sort. The first matter at stake is simply material: Will the market liberal be allowed to retain his earnings from past competition? If some sort of massive redistribution is in prospect, and the market liberal has a lot to lose, here is, it seems, incentive enough to opt for the "from now on" approach. But the matter is a more complex than this, because many market liberals would stand ready to reject even the most minimal redistribution or the the most minimal conferral of advantage on victims of past discrimination.

The reason for this is that the "earner" gets more than goods out of competition. The "earner"-- the person who can "make it on my own"-- distinguishes him or her self from those who don't or can't. This distinction is not simply economic or material. It is moral as well. "Earning" signals the presence in the earner of discipline, energy, rectitude, autonomy, and responsibility. Liberalism's main political tenet is individual freedom. Its main moral tenet is individual self-reliance and responsibility.(1) Policy which concedes that past markets were unfair, and which seeks compensatory remedies of the effects of past unfairness, presents three challenges to the cult of the earner. First, the legitimacy of past earnings and attendant distinctiveness is undermined. Second, unhampered opportunity for further earning is undermined in the interest of social goals. Third, the material symbols of "earning" are conferred on competitors who, because of preferential treatment, did not have to establish their moral suitability to "earn."

Wills grasps the essence of the cult of the earner when he writes,

> It is this morality of demonstrated daily desert--this meritocracy, with active trading in merits and demerits--that lies behind heartland America's hatred of welfare and relief and the systematic alleviation of poverty. The deserving rise; if the undeserving are also helped, what happens to the scoring in this game of spiritual effort and merit badges? The free-market of virtue and soul-making is destroyed by such "controls," such interference with incentive. (Wills, 1969: 160).

William Connolly has recently offered a sensitive description of the sources of white concern about the American welfare state's implications for the values of the market mode of life. He writes,

> If a person's identity is centered on the relation between work and family; if he believes (or, better, struggles to believe) that one bears a large share of credit or blame for the kind of person one becomes, the character one develops, the income one earns, the values endorsed by one's children, and the opportunities placed within their reach, then public programs and rhetoric that jeopardize this identity will be construed as attacks on the self one has become. (Connolly, 1981: 9-10).

Given what the market liberal--the "earner"--has at stake it would not be surprising to find him or her rejecting out of hand race policies that threaten their earnings and the selves they symbolize.

How is such a rejection likely to be justified? A perusal of Appendix C gives us a clue. The items in this appendix are drawn from the 1972 and 1976 SRC/CPS surveys. They reveal an overwhelming inclination on the part of white Americans to downplay the market disabilities inflicted on victims of past discrimination, to defend the basic fairness of contemporary competition, and to assert the potency of the market competitor with "marketable" skills and with the proper commitment to the discipline of the "earner." If we look at the three items employed in Index 1 from the 1972 survey, over 50% of white Americans agreed with <u>all three</u> of the statements (Scored 2) that deny the existence and importance of racial discrimination, and that emphasize the efficacy of individual economic effort. About 75% agree with at least two such assertions. The dilemma of market values and race policy is that the standard of the "fair" market is both compelling and threatening to white "earners." Using the items in Appendix C (and other items) we will see in the next section how this dilemma has manifested itself in the evolution of white Americans' attitudes about race policy.

II. THE EVOLUTION OF WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT RACE POLICIES: 1964-1980

If white Americans are genuinely committed to the values of the "fair" market, how should such a commitment manifest itself in the evolution of their attitudes about government race policy? We can begin thinking about this question by recalling the assertion above that given the professed ideals of the market mode of life, the exclusion of anyone-- let alone a race--from full participation in the marketplace is indefensible. Myrdal (1944) saw the roots of the "American Dilemma" in the tension between the professed egalitarian ideals of white Americans and the practice of racial segregation and discrimination. Myrdal's optimism concerning the future prospects of blacks stemmed in large measure from the successes, past and anticipated, of blacks in exploiting this tension between rhetoric and practice. He believed that there were latent values--classical liberal values-- that could be activated on behalf of the rights of blacks.

This paper cannot attempt an analysis of the tactics of civil rights activists or of the vulnerabilities of white Americans to such tactics. It will suffice here to say that on the premise that many white Americans genuinely believe in the values of market liberalism, they should have found the appeals by blacks for full enjoyment of their civil rights very influential. The evolution of white attitudes should, then, feature moves away from active support for, or acquiescence in, exclusionary racial practices, and display moves toward support for racial policies and practices that guarantee the rights of blacks to compete in the social marketplace. These moves should, however, be limited to policies that seem to affirm, rather than alter, the market.

Evolution of Race Policy Attitudes: A Hypothetical Approach

Presenting the steps of this evolution of attitudes schematically, it can be said (See Figure 1) that white market liberals should find

FIGURE 1

1	2	3	4
Support for, or acquiescence in, segregation and discrimination	Endorsement of Organic Integration	Endorsement of Government Guarantees	Endorsement of Market Alterations

the move from point 1 to point 2 fairly easy, the move from point 2 to point 3 a bit more difficult, and the move from point 3 to point 4 anathema.

The nature of these moves could be characterized, hypothetically, as follows:

A) 1 to 2: Exclusion of blacks from the social marketplace is indefensible on market liberal premises. As this untenability becomes manifest and tensified, it should lead to increasing support for the idea that blacks should be allowed to participate fully in social competition and enjoy the benefits and rewards of success in the competition. This is a move toward support for "organic integration." Endorsement of organic integration connotes support for those economic advances by blacks, and integrating consequences, that would occur if discriminatory practices were simply dropped. The most notable aspect of the move to support for organic integration is that it does not involve government activity on behalf of blacks and their rights.

B) 2 to 3: Should government become involved in ensuring that blacks enjoy their right to compete in a fair arena? It is on this question that market liberals seem to face a dilemma; two liberal principles are in apparent conflict. Social competition should be fair, but government's role in society should be minimal, especially in the realm of individual competition. But this dilemma is more apparent than real. The government's role is to ensure the fairness of the competition, thus legitimating and upholding the results, albeit unequal, of competition. Government should, then, take action to guarantee to blacks the right to compete and to enjoy the fruits of success. Market liberals ought eventually to see this point. Though the impression that the government has gotten too deeply involved in social competition may slow the emergence of support for government guarantees, market liberals should finally see guarantees as affirming and protecting market competition.

C) 3 to 4: Of course, not all government agency on behalf of blacks will be acceptable to market liberals. They will evaluate policies in terms of their stance toward social competition. That is, the <u>intent</u> of policy concerning rules of competition should become the basis of policy evaluation, not the beneficiaries of the policy (blacks), and not its vehicle (government). What sort of policy would seem to have an unacceptable intent? The sort that seeks to directly influence <u>outcomes</u> of competition, that seems to give preferment to certain competitors, or that seems to call into question the enjoyment of "earned" social distinction stemming from success in the marketplace. Affirmative action (perceived intent of altering outcomes, preferment of certain classes of competitors), busing (undermines the earned distinction of being able to afford certain residential arrangements and attendant educational opportunities), and various programs of aid to blacks (perceived preferment) are all anathema since they seem to involve government in altering the outcome of market competition.

<u>Expectations and Operationalization</u>

The SRC/CPS American National Election Studies from 1964 to 1980 ask respondents a variety of questions concerning their attitudes about blacks, racial practices in America, the federal government, and government race policies. The 1972 and 1976 surveys include items that allow an exploration of commitment to the view of American society as a

fair market in which individual effort is efficacious. Appendix A contains the texts of questions eliciting attitudes about blacks, the federal government, and organic integration. Appendix B contains the texts of questions concerning government race policies. Questions concerning the social marketplace are presented in Appendix C. A brief perusal of these appendices will make the coming discussion easier to understand.

What findings should we expect from an analysis of the evolution of white attitudes about race practices and policies? No analysis of survey data will produce results as tidy as those just presented in the hypothetical discussion above. But if the clear moves outlined above are manifested as tendencies and trends in the data analyzed, we should find the following:

A) increasing levels of support for organic integration,
B) more slowly increasing levels of support for government action to guarantee market fairness for blacks, and
C) opposition to market-altering policies.

As native market liberalism is activated as a basis of policy evaluation, we should also find:

E) a declining salience of racial affect as a basis of policy evaluation, (Attitudes about blacks should increasingly be seen as an inappropriate basis for policy evaluation. Market liberal values should supplant this basis of policy evaluation.)
F) a declining salience of concern about the size and role of government as basis of policy evaluation in the case of policies that are seen to affirm the market, and increasing salience in the case of market-altering policies, and
G) clear evidence that attitudes about the market are important. The more convinced respondents are that the market is fair and that individual effort will bring success the more likely they should be to oppose market-altering policies.

Findings

An initial impression of the nature of the evolution of white attitudes about race policies and practices can be gained by simply tracing white support for certain policies and practices. Figure 2

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

traces respondent support for various policies and practices. We have rather incomplete information due to the elimination of several questions, but several points can be made. First, the practice of organic integration, measured in this case as support for the right of blacks to live wherever they can afford, receives virtually consensual support by 1976. Recalling Figure 1, we can say that the move from point 1 to point 2 has been substantially made by most whites.

Support for market-affirming government action to guarantee the

rights of blacks follows the same upward pattern, but we lack recent data points needed to determine if this trend has continued. The movement from point 2 to 3 seems, at least, well underway, especially in the case of accommodations rights. What of the move from 3 to 4? Two policies that are likely to be perceived as market-altering, busing and government "aid to minorities", receive initial low support, followed by further declines in support. School integration provides an interesting case, it seems, of changing perceptions of policy intent. The question wording on school integration does not mention busing as a means of integrating schools, but refers only to the government seeing to it that black and white children go to the same schools. As busing emerges as a highly publicized approach to integration, support for action to integrate schools declines. In the 1976 survey, the gamma of association between attitudes about busing and attitudes about school integration is .66. It's hard to say whether the policy of school integration was initially perceived as market-affirming, market-altering, or perhaps even market-neutral, but as its association with busing became stronger --triggering concerns over government altering the market-- support dwindles.

That summarizes, in brief, the trends of the dependent variables of policy support. What of the independent variables? An obvious basis of white respondents' evaluations of race policies is their attitudes about policy beneficiaries: blacks. As noted earlier, on the premise that white Americans are market liberals groping toward a market liberal stance on race policies, the salience of racial affect as a basis of policy evaluation should decline over time. Blacks should be seen as citizens entitled to the same guarantees of market fairness as everyone else, hence the link between racial affect and policy evaluation should eventually be broken.

The SRC/CPS surveys contain a very straightforward measure of racial affect: a feeling thermometer on which respondents are asked to indicate how "warm" they feel toward blacks. The scale runs from 0 to 100, with 50 representing affective neutrality. For the present analysis those below 50 comprise one category, those at 50 are excluded from analysis, and those above 50 are divided into two groups: 51 to 74, and 75 and up.

Table 1 reports the results of an exploration of the extent of

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

the association between racial affect and policy support. The general expectation of declining association is sustained; gammas of association bottom out in 1972 and 1976 for four of the five policies. In the case of aid to minorities, the trend is one of increasing association. Several aspects of Table 1 should be noted. Even among those who professed to feel low or negative affect toward blacks (0-49), a majority supports government guarantees of accommodations rights by 1972. But by 1972 this declining salience of racial affect has taken a toll at the other end of the scale as well: among those who professed to feel high positive affect toward blacks (75-up), support for the market-altering policies of aid to minorities and

school integration fell off sharply. Here is a clear example that the activation of market liberal values and their use as a standard of policy evaluation is a sword with two edges: in devaluing racial affect as a source of policy evaluative criteria, it weakens the influence of racism and lowers the value of positive racial affect. The mean scores and standard deviations for the feeling thermometer item from 1964 to 1980 have been remarkably stable, indicating that alterations in the strength of associations in Table 1 cannot be attributed to increasing or decreasing affect toward blacks.

Table 2 displays the association between concern with the power of the federal government and race policy attitudes. The expectation was

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

that concern about the role of the federal government should be initially salient in evaluating government guarantee policies, but that such an association should decline. This is the pattern we see with guarantees of fair job treatment and accommodations rights. We also expected to find that market-altering policies would be more likely to be evaluated on the basis of attitudes concerning the power of government in society. This expectation is generally sustained. Once respondents get past the fact of "government making policy," they seem to evaluate the intent (stance toward the market) of the policy and not its creator or executor.

The divergence of support for market-affirming and market-altering policies is striking. In Table 3 we can see that among those who support organic integration there is also majority support for market-affirming policies. But among those who support both organic integration and the market-affirming policy of accommodations rights,

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

there is no majority in support of market-altering policies and declining support for the borderline policy of school integration. Plainly, a willingness to support government guarantees of the rights of blacks has little to do with a willingness to support policies with more substantial market-altering implications. I shall have something to say later concerning what this finding does to illuminate a current debate over the importance of racial tolerance as a basis of race policy support.

Is there some set of respondents, some characteristic attitude, that obliterates --or at least blurs-- this distinction between market-affirming and market-altering policies? Why would they do so? The 1972 and 1976 surveys contain items that allow separation of respondents into categories according to their commitment to the application of market liberal values. Those respondents who believe American society is a competitive arena in which individual effort is efficacious, and in which present and past discrimination is not an important influence on the prospects of individual competitors, should overwhelmingly oppose market-altering policies. They should support market-affirming policies, but may evince less support than would be

expected, since such policies at least infer some past unfairness in the market, the recurrence of which government policy needs to prevent.

On the other hand, we should find that among respondents who question the past and present fairness of the social marketplace, and who doubt the efficacy of individual hard work, etc., there is considerable support for market-altering policies. Since the existence of a fair market is questioned, there should be relatively few qualms about policies that seek to alter or control outcomes of social competition.

Table 4 reports on the association between commitment to market values and race policy attitudes in the 1972 CPS survey. (See Appendix C for texts of market items and details of indices construction.)(2) The findings are easy to interpret. Only one policy (accommodations

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

rights), a market-affirming policy receives majority support among those most convinced of the existence in America of a fair social marketplace. Only one policy (busing) fails to receive majority support among those who doubt the existence in America of a fair market; two market-altering policies, aid to minorities and school integration, receive majority support. Various gradations of policy support attend the intermediate levels of commitment to market values. In Table 5, based on questions asked in the 1976 survey, we see the

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

same pattern of association between commitment to a market view of society and race policy attitudes. Unfortunately, the 1976 survey contained no items concerning market-affirming policies, so in Table 5 we do not see the full variety of policy options and gradations of policy support reported in Table 4.

III. IMPLICATIONS

Implications of two sorts follow from the foregoing theory and findings. The first set concerns the on-going debate in political science literature over the sources of citizen opposition to government race policies. The second set of implications concerns the durability of American commitment to market liberalism and market-affirming policies, and the consequences of such a commitment for racial inequality in America.

Debate in Political Science Literature

Review. The findings reported here illuminate several problems in existing rival accounts of citizen attitudes about race policy. The recent development of these rival accounts began with Jackman's (1978) discussion of whether education increases commitment to racial integration. The received wisdom before Jackman's work appeared was

that better educated Americans were more tolerant and more supportive of racial integration than those with less education. Jackman's research challenged this view, showing that the well-educated were not significantly more likely to support government action that pursued the goal of racial integration. Her conclusion was that the well-educated have learned to pay lip service to the general norms of racial equality, but when it comes to supporting applied integration policy this support withers. Racial hypocrisy is, then, the problem. The solution is the development within the populace of a "true" commitment to racial integration which carries over into policy support.

Kuklinski and Parent (1981) challenged Jackman's account, pointing out that questions about integration policy contain two stimuli: policy and government. Such multiple stimuli, they claimed, confound analysis; respondents could be reacting to the intent of the policy or to the federal government. Margolis and Haque (1981) also assert that Jackman has taken insufficient account of the influence of negative attitudes about the federal government on race policy support. They find that those who are most concerned with the power and trustworthiness of the federal government are less willing to see the government in Washington get involved in integration. Diminution of the citizenry's negative view of the federal government is, then, the key to increasing support for race policies.

Sniderman, Brody, and Kuklinski (1981) have recently addressed what they call the "slippage" among the well-educated of support for the principle of equality and support for policy that pursues racial equality. They suggest that "...conservatism undercuts the resort to activist government to promote equality." They continue,

> ...the irony of education is that it both promotes equality as a principle and—at the same time--equips people to find reasons among their other beliefs to oppose it as a policy. (Sniderman, et al., 1981: 6-7).

The better educated have more constrained belief systems, a fact that triggers the core American political value of limited government.

Discussion. Table 3 in this paper casts some doubt on the general thrust of the "hypocrisy" thesis. Those who support "organic integration" are considerably more supportive of market-affirming policies than the general population of respondents. And among those who support both organic integration and the market-affirming policy of guaranteeing accommodations rights, there is even more substantial support for government guarantees of fair job opportunity for blacks. The same tendency is apparent, though faltering, in the transitional policy of school integration. In the case of market-altering policies, all the apparent good will in the world --support for organic integration and accommodations rights-- is unavailing. These policies are anathema. In sum, before making policy support the "acid test" of tolerance, we need to think about what policies, and at what point in the evolution of white attitudes about policy.

The argument that attitudes about the federal government may be

intervening between support for integration and support for policy needs similar qualification. Concern with the power of the federal government actually becomes less salient with some policies as time passes, and more salient with other policies. Looking at other measures of attitudes about the federal government, we find even more grounds for caution. The gammas of association between policy attitudes and respondents' belief that they could trust the government to "do what's right" averaged .25 in 1964, .25 in 1968, .06 in 1972, .25 in 1976, and .14 in 1980. Gammas of association between race policy attitudes and faith that people in government "know what they're doing" averaged .22 in 1964, .19 in 1968, .15, in 1972, .13 in 1976, and .14 in 1980.

The emphasis on conservatism--understood as a source of hesitancy about government action--bears certain resemblances to the argument made in this paper. But it too is somewhat insensitive to policy intent. Once we understand that "conservative" concern about government action is part of our liberal tradition, and that it is a consequence of the liberal view of government's appropriate (minimal) role as guarantor of fairness in market competition, then we can sort out policies in terms of their stance toward competition. In Table 2, the difference in policy support between "conservatives" (those who think the federal government is too powerful) and "non-conservatives" (those who don't) is, indeed, rather small for market-affirming policies once the "shock" of new government activity wears off.

Moreover, the claim that employment of conservative policy evaluation standards is the province of the well-educated, who presumably have more highly constrained belief systems, needs revision. Market liberalism/cult of the earner is a game anybody can play; indeed most white Americans do play it. This view of society and self is absolutely fundamental to America as a society. (Feldman, 1981).

Race Policy and Racial Inequality

This fundamental aspect of market liberalism, and its tenacity in America, raises questions of the most serious sort for the future of race policy and racial inequality in America.

In his recent book Rules and Racial Equality (1979), Edwin Dorn discusses the impact of various types of rules on social inequalities. He illustrates the difference between "open" and "closed" rules as follows:

> Suppose I write a law that says, "Every person over age 65 will receive social security benefits." This is a closed rule with respect to social security benefits. I know what every person over 65 will receive. And if I find someone over 65 who is not receiving benefits, I can infer that the rule has been violated. But suppose I reword the rule to read, "Every person over 65 is eligible for social security benefits." It then does not guarantee that he will receive them. And if he does not receive

> them I cannot infer that the rule has been violated. I can, of course, list violation as one of the possible explanations, along with the possibilities that he does not want the benefits and that he is unaware of his eligibility. (Dorn, 1979: 5).

Closed rules entail a specific result or set of results, while open rules do not entail any result, save themselves. As Dorn points out, rules are open or closed with respect to some outcome: a rule that is closed with respect to the distribution of cake among children may be open with respect to distribution of other things.

How can we characterize the findings of the preceding section given the vocabulary of open and closed rules? The values of market liberalism emphasize the enforcement of open rules that give competitors a basic stock of procedural rights that they need in order to be able to compete. These rules are open with respect to economic outcomes: no specifiable economic results follow, for instance, from the guarantee that blacks may eat in any restaurant they can afford. No necessary economic result follows from the enactment of guarantees of fair job treatment of blacks. With these two rules it is not the case that no economic results follow because the rules have been violated (though, of course, they are violated), nor because they are susceptible to undetected violations. Rather, the rules simply have <u>no necessary economic consequences</u>.

Rules that are perceived to have some sort of closed nature with respect to competitive economic outcomes or the enjoyment of the fruits of past competitive success have been rejected by most white Americans. Aid to minorities (which seems to enlist the support of government on behalf of minorities in the marketplace), busing (which threatens the "earned" distinctions of market succeeders), and affirmative action (which is doubtless seen as an effort to rig the social competition in favor of certain outcomes), have all received ringing rejections from white Americans.

There is currently a thriving debate concerning the nature and causes of inter-racial and intra-racial economic inequality in America (Wilson, 1978; Clark and Gershman, 1980). The results of this study may serve, hopefully, as both a source of explanation of those inequalities, and as an unavoidably pessimistic account of the practical political limits on future policies that aim to eliminate these inequalities.

FIGURE 2
Trends in White Support
for Race Policies and Practices



TABLE 1

Racial Affect/Policy Attitudes

	Gamma	Overall Policy Approval (%)	Policy Approval (%) Racial Affect 0-49	51-74	75-up
ENSURE ACCOMMODATIONS RIGHTS:					
1964	.50	51.7	28.2	49.6	70.9
1968	.47	57.6	27.5	57.0	71.3
1972	.08	68.0	57.3	70.6	68.9
ENSURE FAIR JOB OPPORTUNITY:					
1964	.41	43.7	23.3	43.5	57.6
1968	.41	41.9	23.8	36.8	56.1
1972	.12	47.5	44.3	44.0	51.2
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:					
1964	.52	49.4	22.9	48.8	67.8
1968	.42	42.5	21.1	39.0	55.8
1972	.12	41.0	30.4	41.3	43.6
1976	.10	32.5	19.0	38.0	31.9
BUSING:					
1972	.10	6.8	1.3	3.4	11.1
1976	.06	7.0	1.9	8.8	7.0
1980	.14	6.0	.7	6.8	7.5
AID TO MINORITIES:					
1972	.14	33.8	28.0	30.4	41.1
1976	.19	31.8	14.2	35.6	34.6
1980	.33	19.0	7.1	19.9	24.6

TABLE 2

Concern with Power of Federal Government/
Policy Attitudes

	Gamma	Overall Policy Approval(%)	Policy Approval (%) Fed Gov't Too Powerful	Fed Gov't Not too Powerful
ENSURE ACCOMMODATIONS RIGHTS:				
1964	.58	48.3	32.4	64.1
1972	.33	56.5	50.3	66.8
1976	.06	69.2	68.3	70.8
ENSURE FAIR JOB OPPORTUNITY:				
1964	.54	40.5	26.5	54.9
1968	.40	40.9	33.1	53.4
1972	.16	48.8	45.7	53.9
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:				
1964	.49	46.1	33.4	59.5
1968	.46	39.4	30.3	53.8
1972	.11	41.1	39.0	44.5
1976	.44	30.5	25.2	46.4
BUSING:				
1972	.03	7.1	7.2	6.8
1976	.14	6.2	5.0	10.0
1980	.13	4.5	3.0	10.3
AID TO MINORITIES:				
1972	.10	33.1	32.2	34.8
1976	.18	28.9	25.9	38.2
1980	.24	16.0	13.1	26.6

TABLE 3

Consequences of Support for Organic Integration and Accommodations Rights

	Policy Approval (%)		
	Overall Policy Approval (%)	Among Supporters of Organic Integration	Among Supporters of Organic Integration & Accomodations Rights
ENSURE ACCOMMODATIONS RIGHTS:			
1964	47.2	68.1	----
1968	56.8	69.9	----
1972	69.2	78.4	
ENSURE FAIR JOB OPPORTUNITY:			
1964	39.0	53.5	68.8
1968	41.6	47.5	60.6
1972	48.8	54.4	64.4
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:			
1964	43.2	64.3	79.6
1968	40.6	51.9	65.5
1972	41.1	48.2	59.2
1976	27.3	33.5	**
BUSING:			
1972	7.1	8.2	10.8
1976	6.1	7.1	**
AID TO MINORITIES:			
1972	33.2	37.2	41.0
1976	29.8	31.3	**

**No measure of support for guarantees of accommodations rights is available for 1976. No measure of support for either organic integration or accommodations rights is available for 1980.

TABLE 4

Commitment to Market Values and Race Policy Attitudes: 1972

Gamma	Policy Approval(%) Market Commitment as Measured by Index 1 Low	Low/Moderate	High/Moderate	High
ENSURE ACCOMMODATIONS RIGHTS:				
.38	92.2	80.8	72.8	61.4
ENSURE FAIR JOB OPPORTUNITY:				
.36	76.0	60.8	52.6	39.1
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:				
.39	79.1	50.8	42.3	30.3
BUSING:				
.44	32.7	8.2	3.8	2.1
AID TO MINORITIES:				
.39	72.0	44.9	31.3	18.5

Gamma	Policy Approval(%) Market Commitment as Measured by Index 2 Low	Moderate	High
ENSURE ACCOMMODATIONS RIGHTS:			
.35	90.4	69.9	63.9
ENSURE FAIR JOB OPPORTUNITY:			
.34	66.0	53.1	40.0
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:			
.34	61.7	43.5	33.1
BUSING:			
.45	17.1	6.9	1.7
AID TO MINORITIES:			
.38	58.8	42.0	22.6

TABLE 5

Commitment to Market Values and Race Policy Attitudes: 1976

	Policy Approval (%) Market Commitment as Measured by Index 3			
Gamma	Low	Low/Moderate	High/Moderate	High
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:				
.46	71.1	45.1	41.7	22.0
BUSING:				
.36	19.0	14.9	8.8	2.4
AID TO MINORITIES:				
.30	51.8	44.7	35.2	21.5

	Policy Approval (%) Market Commitment as Measured by Index 4			
Gamma	Low	Low/Moderate	High/Moderate	High
ENSURE SCHOOL INTEGRATION:				
.29	47.0	39.6	24.3	24.1
BUSING:				
.31	15.3	7.6	4.4	1.3
AID TO MINORITIES:				
.18	41.0	31.5	26.8	16.3

Appendix A

Question Texts: Concern with Power of Federal Government, Racial Affect, and Organic Integration

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Concern with Power of Federal Government:

What is your feeling, do you think the government is getting too powerful or do you think the federal government is not getting too strong?

--The government is getting too powerful.
--The government is not getting too strong.

Feeling Thermometer:

Respondents were asked to assess their feelings toward blacks. The Thermometer ranges from 0 to 100, with 50 denoting feelings that aren't particularly warm of cold.

Organic Integration:

Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

--White people have a right to exclude Negroes (Blacks) out of their neighborhoods if they want to.
--Negroes (Blacks) have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like anybody else.

Appendix B

Question Texts: Race Policy Items

Ensure Fair Job Opportunity:

How do you feel? Should the government in Washington see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs or leave these matters to the states and local communities?

--See to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs.
--Leave these matters to the states and local communities.

Ensure School Integration:

Do you think the government in Washington should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools or stay out of this area as it is not its business?

--See to it that white and black children go to the same schools.
--Stay out of this area as it is not its business.

Busing:

There is much discussion about the best way to deal with racial problems. Some people think achieving racial integration is so important that it justifies busing children to schools out of their own neighborhoods. Others think letting children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

--Bus to achieve integration.
--Keep children in neighborhood schools.

Ensure Accommodation Rights:

Should the government support the right of black people to go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford, or should it stay out of this matter?

--Go to any hotel or restaurant they can afford.
--Stay out of this manner.

Aid to Minorities:

Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every possible effort to improve the social and economic positions of blacks and other minority groups. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help minorities because they should help themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

--Government should help minority groups.
--Minority groups should help themselves.

Appendix C

Question Texts for Four Market Indices/Response Percentages

The indices use dichotomized variables, each scored 1 or 2: 1 is assigned to responses that do not fall within the market mode, and 2 is assigned to those responses which characterize commitment to market values. These scores were then summed to create the various indices.

1972:

Index 1 - References to Blacks

Item 1:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

13.6% --Discrimination affects all black people. The only way to handle it is for blacks to organize together and demand rights for all. (Scored 1)
86.4% --Discrimination may affect all blacks but the best way to handle it is for each individual to act like any other American -- to work hard, get a good education, and mind his own business. (Scored 2)

Item 2:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

68.8% --It's lack of skill and abilities that keep many black people from getting a job. It's not just because they're black. When a black person is trained to do something, he is able to get a job. (Scored 2)
31.2% --Many qualified black people can't get a good job. White people with the same skills wouldn't have any trouble. (Scored 1)

Item 3:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

76.2% --Many blacks have only themselves to blame for not doing better in life. If they tried harder, they'd do better. (Scored 2)
23.8% --When two qualified people, one black and one white, are considered for the same job, the black won't get the job no matter how hard he tries. (Scored 1)

Index 2 - References to Poor People

Item 1:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

23.3% --People who are born poor have less chance to get ahead than other people. (Scored 1)
74.7% --People who have the ability and work hard have the same chance as anyone else, even if their parents were poor. (Scored 2)

Item 2:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

72.0% --Many poor people simply don't want to work hard. (Scored 2)
28.0% --The poor are poor because the American way of life doesn't give all people an equal chance. (Scored 1)

1976:

Index 3 - References to Blacks

Item 1:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

11.9% --Discrimination affects all black people. The only way to handle it is for blacks to organize together and demand rights for all. (Scored 1)
88.1% --Discrimination may affect all blacks but the best way to handle it is for each individual to act like any other American -- to work hard, get a good education, and mind his own business. (Scored 2)

Item 2:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

10.3% --Many black people who don't do well in life have good training, but the opportunities just go to whites. (Scored 1)
89.7% --Black people may not have the same opportunities as whites, but many blacks haven't prepared themselves enough to make use of the opportunities that came their way. (Scored 2)

Item 3:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

24.7% --The attempt to fit in and do what's proper hasn't paid off for blacks. It doesn't matter how proper you are, you still meet serious discrimination if you're black. (Scored 1)
75.3% --The problem for many blacks is that they aren't really acceptable by American standards. Any black who is educated and does what is considered proper will be accepted and will get ahead. (Scored 2)

Index 4 - References to Women

Item 1:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

63.7% --Many qualified women can't get good jobs, men with the same skills have much less trouble. (Scored 1)
36.3% --In general, men are more qualified than women for jobs that have great responsibility. (Scored 2)

Item 2:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

49.1% --Women can best overcome discrimination by pursuing their individual career goals in as feminine a way as possible. (Scored 2)
50.9% --It is not enough for a woman to be successful herself. Women must work together to change laws and customs that are unfair to all women. (Scored 1)

Item 3:
Which of these two statements do you agree with most?

79.9% --The best way to handle problems of discrimination is for each woman to make sure she gets the best training possible for what she wants to do. (Scored 2)
20.1% --Only if women organize and work together can anything really be done about discrimination. (scored 1)

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NOTES

1 The moral component of the cult of the earner has, undoubtedly, very deep roots in Europe and the Protestant Reformation. Tawney (1926),Troeltsch (1960), and Weber (1958) all treat the ascendance of hard work and earning within the Protestant account of virtues. Wills traces this moral component and its creation of moral monsters: "self-made men," to Emerson, Alger, et al.

2 We should note that some of the measures of market commitment refer to blacks in the marketplace. Could market commitment be, as "law and order" have been said to be, codewords for racism? Using a partial gamma technique we can explore the extent to which racial affect, as measured earlier, conditions the relation between commitment to market values and race policy support. This technique revealed virtually no influence of racial affect on this relationship; no difference between the zero-order and first order partial gamma exceeded .05.